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Abstract—Recent research has revealed that the output of
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) can be easily altered by adding
relatively small perturbations to the input vector. In this paper,
we analyze an attack in an extremely limited scenario where only
one pixel can be modified. For that we propose a novel method
for generating one-pixel adversarial perturbations based on dif-
ferential evolution (DE). It requires less adversarial information
(a black-box attack) and can fool more types of networks due
to the inherent features of DE. The results show that 68.36%
of the natural images in Kaggle CIFAR-10 test dataset and
16.04% of the ImageNet (ILSVRC 2012) test images can be
perturbed to at least one target class by modifying just one pixel
with 73.22% and 22.91% confidence on average. We also show
the same vulnerability on original CIFAR-10 dataset. Thus, the
proposed attack explores a different take on adversarial machine
learning in an extreme limited scenario, showing that current
DNNs are also vulnerable to such low dimension attacks. Besides,
we also illustrate an important application of DE (or broadly
speaking, evolutionary computation) in the domain of adversarial
machine learning: creating tools that can effectively generate low-
cost adversarial attacks against neural networks for evaluating
robustness.
Index Terms—Differential Evolution, Convolutional Neural
Network, Information Security, Image Recognition.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the domain of image recognition, DNN-based approachhas outperform traditional image processing techniques,
achieving even human-competitive results [25]. However, sev-
eral studies have revealed that artificial perturbations on natu-
ral images can easily make DNN misclassify and accordingly
proposed effective algorithms for generating such samples
called “adversarial images” [7][11][18][24]. A common idea
for creating adversarial images is adding a tiny amount of
well-tuned additive perturbation, which is expected to be
imperceptible to human eyes, to a correctly classified natural
image. Such modification can cause the classifier to label the
modified image as a completely different class. Unfortunately,
most of the previous attacks did not consider extremely limited
scenarios for adversarial attacks, namely the modifications
might be excessive (i.e., the amount of modified pixels is fairly
large) such that it may be perceptible to human eyes (see Fig-
ure 3 for an example). Additionally, investigating adversarial
images created under extremely limited scenarios might give
new insights about the geometrical characteristics and overall
behavior of DNN’s model in high dimensional space [9]. For
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Fig. 1. One-pixel attacks created with the proposed algorithm that success-
fully fooled three types of DNNs trained on CIFAR-10 dataset: The All
convolutional network (AllConv), Network in network (NiN) and VGG. The
original class labels are in black color while the target class labels and the
corresponding confidence are given below.
example, the characteristics of adversarial images close to the
decision boundaries can help describing the boundaries’ shape.
In this paper, by perturbing only one pixel with differential
evolution, we propose a black-box DNN attack in a scenario
where the only information available is the probability labels
(Figure 1 and 2) Our proposal has mainly the following
advantages compared to previous works:
• Effectiveness - On Kaggle CIFAR-10 dataset, being able
to launch non-targeted attacks by only modifying one
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2Fig. 2. One-pixel attacks on ImageNet dataset where the modified pixels are
highlighted with red circles. The original class labels are in black color while
the target class labels and their corresponding confidence are given below.
pixel on three common deep neural network structures
with 68.71%, 72.85% and 63.53% success rates. We
additionally find that each natural image can be perturbed
to 1.9, 2.3 and 1.7 other classes. On original CIFAR-
10 dataset with a more limited attack scenario, we show
22.60%, 35.20% and 31.40% success rates. On ImageNet
dataset, non-targeted attacking the BVLC AlexNet model
also by changing one pixel shows that 16.04% of the test
images can be attacked.
• Semi-Black-Box Attack - Requires only black-box feed-
back (probability labels) but no inner information of
target DNNs such as gradients and network structures.
Our method is also simpler than existing approaches since
it does not abstract the problem of searching perturbation
to any explicit target functions but directly focus on in-
creasing the probability label values of the target classes.
• Flexibility - Can attack more types of DNNs (e.g.,
networks that are not differentiable or when the gradient
calculation is difficult).
Regarding the extremely limited one-pixel attack scenario,
there are several main reasons why we consider it:
• Analyze the Vicinity of Natural Images - Geometri-
cally, several previous works have analyzed the vicinity
of natural images by limiting the length of perturbation
vector. For example, the universal perturbation adds small
value to each pixel such that it searches the adversarial
images in a sphere region around the natural image [14].
On the other side, the proposed few-pixel perturbations
can be regarded as cutting the input space using very low-
dimensional slices, which is a different way of explor-
ing the features of high dimensional DNN input space.
Among them, one-pixel attack is an extreme case of
several-pixel attack. Theoretically, it can give geometrical
Fig. 3. An illustration of the adversarial images generated by using Jacobian
saliency-map approach [18]. The perturbation is conducted on about 4% of
the total pixels and can be obvious to human eyes. Since the adversarial pixel
perturbation has become a common way of generating adversarial images,
such abnormal “noise” might be recognized with expertise.
insight to the understanding of CNN input space, in
contrast to another extreme case: universal adversarial
perturbation [14] that modifies every pixel.
• A Measure of Perceptiveness - The attack can be effec-
tive for hiding adversarial modification in practice. To the
best of our knowledge, none of the previous works can
guarantee that the perturbation made can be completely
imperceptible. A direct way of mitigating this problem
is to limit the amount of modifications to as few as
possible. Specifically, instead of theoretically proposing
additional constraints or considering more complex cost
functions for conducting perturbation, we propose an
empirical solution by limiting the number of pixels that
can be modified. In other words, we use the number of
pixels as units instead of length of perturbation vector to
measure the perturbation strength and consider the worst
case which is one-pixel modification, as well as two other
scenarios (i.e. 3 and 5 pixels) for comparison.
II. RELATED WORKS
The security problem of DNN has become a critical topic
[1][2]. C. Szegedy et al. first revealed the sensitivity to
well-tuned artificial perturbation [24] which can be crafted
by several gradient-based algorithms using back-propagation
for obtaining gradient information [11][24]. Specifically,
I.J.Goodfellow et al. proposed “fast gradient sign” algorithm
for calculating effective perturbation based on a hypothesis
in which the linearity and high-dimensions of inputs are the
main reason that a broad class of networks are sensitive to
small perturbation [11]. S.M. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. proposed
a greedy perturbation searching method by assuming the
linearity of DNN decision boundaries [7]. In addition, N.
3Papernot et al. utilize Jacobian matrix to build “Adversarial
Saliency Map” which indicates the effectiveness of conducting
a fixed length perturbation through the direction of each axis
[18][20]. Except adversarial perturbation, there are other ways
of creating adversarial images to make the DNN misclassify,
such as artificial image [16] and rotation [36]. Besides, adver-
sarial perturbation can be also possible in other domains such
as speech recognition [33], natural language processing [34]
and malware classification [35].
A number of detection and defense methods have been also
proposed to mitigate the vulnerability induced by adversarial
perturbation [39]. For instance, network distillation which was
originally proposed for squeezing information of an network
to a smaller one is found to be able to reduce the network
sensitivity enhancing the robustness of the neural network [40].
Adversarial training [41] is proposed for adding adversarial
images to the training data such that the robustness against
known adversarial images can be improved. On the other side,
some image processing methods are proved to be effective for
detecting adversarial images. For example, B.Liang et al. show
that noise reduction methods such as scalar quantization and
spatial smoothing filter can be selectively utilized for mitigat-
ing the influence of adversarial perrturbation. By comparing
the label of an image before and after the transformation the
perturbation can be detected [43]. The method works well on
detecting adversarial images with both low and high entropy.
Similarly, W. Xu et al. show that squeezing color bits and
local/non-local spatial smoothing can have high success rate on
distinguishing adversarial images [42]. However, recent studies
show that many of these defense and detection methods can
be effectively evaded by conducting little modification on the
original attacks [45], [46], [60].
Several black-box attacks that require no internal knowl-
edge about the target systems such as gradients, have also
been proposed [5][17][15]. In particular, to the best of our
knowledge, the only work before ours that ever mentioned
using one-pixel modification to change class labels is carried
out by N. Narodytska et al[15]. However, differently from
our work, they only utilized it as a starting point to derive
a further semi black-box attack which needs to modify more
pixels (e.g., about 30 pixels out of 1024) without considering
the scenario of one-pixel attack. In addition, they have neither
measured systematically the effectiveness of the attack nor
obtained quantitative results for evaluation. An analysis of
the one-pixel attack’s geometrical features as well as further
discussion about its implications are also lacking.
There have been many efforts to understand DNN by
visualizing the activation of network nodes [28] [29][30]while
the geometrical characteristics of DNN boundary have gained
less attraction due to the difficulty of understanding high-
dimensional space. However, the robustness evaluation of
DNN with respect to adversarial perturbation might shed light
in this complex problem [9]. For example, both natural and
random images are found to be vulnerable to adversarial
perturbation. Assuming these images are evenly distributed, it
suggests that most data points in the input space are gathered
near to the boundaries [9]. In addition, A. Fawzi et al. revealed
more clues by conducting a curvature analysis. Their conclu-
sion is that the region along most directions around natural
images are flat with only few directions where the space
is curved and the images are sensitive to perturbation[10].
Interestingly, universal perturbations (i.e. a perturbation that
when added to any natural image can generate adversarial
images with high effectiveness) were shown possible and
to achieve a high effectiveness when compared to random
perturbation. This indicates that the diversity of boundaries
might be low while the boundaries’ shapes near different data
points are similar [14].
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Problem Description
Generating adversarial images can be formalized as an
optimization problem with constraints. We assume an input
image can be represented by a vector in which each scalar
element represents one pixel. Let f be the target image
classifier which receives n-dimensional inputs, x = (x1, .., xn)
be the original natural image correctly classified as class t. The
probability of x belonging to the class t is therefore ft(x). The
vector e(x) = (e1, .., en) is an additive adversarial perturbation
according to x, the target class adv and the limitation of
maximum modification L. Note that L is always measured
by the length of vector e(x). The goal of adversaries in the
case of targeted attacks is to find the optimized solution e(x)∗
for the following question:
maximize
e(x)∗
fadv(x + e(x))
subject to ‖e(x)‖ ≤ L
The problem involves finding two values: (a) which dimen-
sions that need to be perturbed and (b) the corresponding
strength of the modification for each dimension. In our ap-
proach, the equation is slightly different:
maximize
e(x)∗
fadv(x + e(x))
subject to ‖e(x)‖0 ≤ d,
where d is a small number. In the case of one-pixel attack d =
1. Previous works commonly modify a part of all dimensions
while in our approach only d dimensions are modified with
the other dimensions of e(x) left to zeros.
The one-pixel modification can be seen as perturbing the
data point along a direction parallel to the axis of one of the
n dimensions. Similarly, the 3 (5)-pixel modification moves
the data points within 3 (5)-dimensional cubes. Overall, few-
pixel attack conducts perturbations on the low-dimensional
slices of input space. In fact, one-pixel perturbation allows the
modification of an image towards a chosen direction out of n
possible directions with arbitrary strength. This is illustrated
in Figure 4 for the case when n = 3.
Thus, usual adversarial images are constructed by pertur-
bating all pixels with an overall constraint on the strength
of accumulated modification[8][14] while the few-pixel attack
considered in this paper is the opposite which specifically
focus on few pixels but does not limit the strength of modifi-
cation.
4Fig. 4. An illustration of using one and two-pixel perturbation attack in
a 3-dimensional input space (i.e. the image has three pixels). The green
point (sphere) denotes a natural image. In the case of one-pixel perturbation,
the search space is the three perpendicular lines that intersect at point of
natural image, which are denoted by red and black stripes. For two-pixel
perturbation, the search space is the three blue (shaded) two-dimensional
planes. In summary, one and two-pixel attacks search the perturbation on
respectively one and two dimensional slices of the original three dimensional
input space.
B. Differential Evolution
Differential evolution (DE) is a population based optimiza-
tion algorithm for solving complex multi-modal optimization
problems [23], [6]. DE belongs to the general class of evo-
lutionary algorithms (EA). Moreover, it has mechanisms in
the population selection phase that keep the diversity such
that in practice it is expected to efficiently find higher quality
solutions than gradient-based solutions or even other kinds
of EAs [4]. In specific, during each iteration another set of
candidate solutions (children) is generated according to the
current population (parents). Then the children are compared
with their corresponding parents, surviving if they are more
fitted (possess higher fitness value) than their parents. In
such a way, only comparing the parent and his child, the
goal of keeping diversity and improving fitness values can
be simultaneously achieved.
DE does not use the gradient information for optimizing
and therefore does not require the objective function to be
differentiable or previously known. Thus, it can be utilized
on a wider range of optimization problems compared to
gradient based methods (e.g., non-differentiable, dynamic,
noisy, among others). The use of DE for generating adversarial
images have the following main advantages:
• Higher probability of Finding Global Optima - DE is
a meta-heuristic which is relatively less subject to local
minima than gradient descent or greedy search algorithms
(this is in part due to diversity keeping mechanisms and
the use of a set of candidate solutions). Moreover, the
problem considered in this article has a strict constraint
(only one pixel can be modified) making it relatively
harder.
• Require Less Information from Target System - DE
does not require the optimization problem to be differ-
entiable as is required by classical optimization methods
such as gradient descent and quasi-newton methods. This
is critical in the case of generating adversarial images
since 1) There are networks that are not differentiable,
for instance [26]. 2) Calculating gradient requires much
more information about the target system which can be
hardly realistic in many cases.
• Simplicity - The approach proposed here is independent
of the classifier used. For the attack to take place it is
sufficient to know the probability labels.
There are many DE variations/improvements such as self-
adaptive [3], multi-objective [27], among others. The cur-
rent work can be further improved by taking these varia-
tions/improvements into account.
C. Method and Settings
We encode the perturbation into an array (candidate so-
lution) which is optimized (evolved) by differential evolu-
tion. One candidate solution contains a fixed number of
perturbations and each perturbation is a tuple holding five
elements: x-y coordinates and RGB value of the perturbation.
One perturbation modifies one pixel. The initial number of
candidate solutions (population) is 400 and at each iteration
another 400 candidate solutions (children) will be produced
by using the usual DE formula:
xi(g + 1) = xr1(g) + F (xr2(g) + xr3(g)),
r1 6= r2 6= r3,
where xi is an element of the candidate solution, r1, r2, r3
are random numbers, F is the scale parameter set to be 0.5,
g is the current index of generation. Once generated, each
candidate solution compete with their corresponding parents
according to the index of the population and the winner survive
for next iteration. The maximum number of iteration is set
to 100 and early-stop criteria will be triggered when the
probability label of target class exceeds 50% in the case of
targeted attacks on Kaggle CIFAR-10, and when the label of
true class is lower than 5% in the case of non-targeted attacks
on ImageNet. Then the label of true class is compared with the
highest non-true class to evaluate if the attack succeeded. The
initial population is initialized by using uniform distributions
U(1, 32) for CIFAR-10 images and U(1, 227) for ImageNet
images, for generating x-y coordinate (e.g., the image has
a size of 32X32 in CIFAR-10 and for ImageNet we unify
the original images with various resolutions to 227X227) and
Gaussian distributions N (µ=128, σ=127) for RGB values. The
fitness function is simply the probabilistic label of the target
class in the case of CIFAR-10 and the label of true class in
the case of ImageNet. The crossover is not included in our
scheme.
IV. EVALUATION AND RESULTS
The evaluation of the proposed attack method is based
on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets. We introduce several
metrics to measure the effectiveness of the attacks:
• Success Rate - In the case of non-targeted attacks, it is
defined as the percentage of adversarial images that were
5successfully classified by the target system as an arbitrary
target class. In the case of targeted attack, it is defined as
the probability of perturbing a natural image to a specific
target class.
• Adversarial Probability Labels (Confidence) - Accu-
mulates the values of probability label of the target class
for each successful perturbation, then divided by the
total number of successful perturbations. The measure
indicates the average confidence given by the target
system when mis-classifying adversarial images.
• Number of Target Classes - Counts the number of
natural images that successfully perturb to a certain
number (i.e. from 0 to 9) of target classes. In particular, by
counting the number of images that can not be perturbed
to any other classes, the effectiveness of non-targeted
attack can be evaluated.
• Number of Original-Target Class Pairs - Counts the
number of times each original-destination class pair was
attacked.
A. Kaggle CIFAR-10
We train 3 types of common networks: All convolution net-
work [22], Network in Network[13] and VGG16 network[21]
as target image classifiers on CIFAR-10 dataset [12], [64].
The structures of the networks are described in Table 1, 2
and 3. The network setting were kept as similar as possible
to the original with a few modifications in order to get the
highest classification accuracy. Both the scenarios of targeted
and non-targeted attacks are considered. For each of the attacks
on the three types of neural networks 500 natural images are
randomly selected from the Kaggle CIFAR-10 test dataset to
conduct the attack.
Note that we use the Kaggle CIFAR-10 test dataset [64]
instead of original one for this experiments. The dataset con-
tains 300,000 cifar-10 images which can be visually inspected
to have the following modifications: duplication, rotation,
clipping, blurring, adding few random bad pixels and so
on. However, the exact employed modification algorithm is
not released. This makes it a more practical dataset which
simulates common scenarios that images can contain unknown
random noise. We also show the results on original CIFAR-10
test dataset in a later chapter for comparison.
In addition, an experiment is conducted on the all convolu-
tion network [22] by generating 500 adversarial images with
three and five pixel-modification. The objective is to compare
one-pixel attack with three and five pixel attacks. For each
natural image, nine target attacks are launched trying to perturb
it to the other 9 target classes. Note that we actually only
launch targeted attacks and the effectiveness of non-targeted
attack is evaluated based on targeted attack results. That is,
if an image can be perturbed to at least one target class
out of total 9 classes, the non-targeted attack on this image
succeeds. Overall, it leads to the total of 36000 adversarial
images created. To evaluate the effectiveness of the attacks,
some established measures from the literature are used as well
as some new kinds of measures are introduced:
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=96)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=96)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 2, depth=96)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=192)
dropout(0.3)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 2, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 2, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=1, stride = 1, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=1, stride = 1, depth=10)
average pooling layer(kernel=6, stride=1)
flatten layer
softmax classifier
TABLE I
ALL CONVOLUTION NETWORK
conv2d layer(kernel=5, stride = 1, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=1, stride = 1, depth=160)
conv2d layer(kernel=1, stride = 1, depth=96)
max pooling layer(kernel=3, stride=2)
dropout(0.5)
conv2d layer(kernel=5, stride = 1, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=5, stride = 1, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=5, stride = 1, depth=192)
average pooling layer(kernel=3, stride=2)
dropout(0.5)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=1, stride = 1, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=1, stride = 1, depth=10)
average pooling layer(kernel=8, stride=1)
flatten layer
softmax classifier
TABLE II
NETWORK IN NETWORK
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=64)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=64)
max pooling layer(kernel=2, stride=2)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=128)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=128)
max pooling layer(kernel=2, stride=2)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=256)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=256)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=256)
max pooling layer(kernel=2, stride=2)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=512)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=512)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=512)
max pooling layer(kernel=2, stride=2)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=512)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=512)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=512)
max pooling layer(kernel=2, stride=2)
flatten layer
fully connected(size=2048)
fully connected(size=2048)
softmax classifier
TABLE III
VGG16 NETWORK
B. ImageNet
For ImageNet we applied a non-targeted attack with the
same DE parameter settings used on the CIFAR-10 dataset,
although ImageNet has a search space 50 times larger than
CIFAR-10. Note that we actually launch the non-targeted
attack for ImageNet by using a fitness function that aims
to decrease the probability label of the true class. Different
from CIFAR-10, whose effectiveness of non-targeted attack
is calculated based on the targeted attack results carried out
by using a fitness function for increasing the probability of
6target classes. Given the time constraints, we conduct the
experiment without proportionally increasing the number of
evaluations, i.e. we keep the same number of evaluations. Our
tests are run over the BVLC AlexNet using 150 images from
ILSVRC 2012 test set selected randomly for the attack. For
ImageNet we only conduct one pixel attack because we want
to verify if such a tiny modification can fool images with
larger size and if it is computationally tractable to conduct
such attacks. The ILSVRC 2012 images are in lossy jpeg
format with non-unified sizes. In order to reduce the practical
interference to the evaluation as much as possible, we first
convert all target images from jpeg to png therefore during
later processing it will be lossless. The images are further
resized to 227X227 resolution for inputting to AlexNet (using
nearest filter). Then we follow the same procedure to attacking
CIFAR-10. Note that the discrepancy on pre-processing raw
images (e.g., using center cropping instead of simple resizing)
can influence the classification performance of AlexNet and
attack rate. Here we only show the result on one setting and
leave the comprehensive evaluation of attacking AlexNet using
difference pre-processing methods for future work.
C. Results
The success rates and adversarial probability labels for one-
pixel perturbations on three CIFAR-10 networks and BVLC
network are shown in Table 4 and the three and five-pixel
perturbations on Kaggle CIFAR-10 is shown in Table 5. The
number of target classes is shown by Figure 5. The number
of original-target class pairs is shown by the heat-maps of
Figure 6 and 7. In addition to the number of original-target
class pairs, the total number of times each class had an attack
which either originated or targeted it is shown in Figure 8.
Since only non-targeted attacks are launched on ImageNet,
the “Number of target classes” and “Number of original-target
class pairs” metrics are not included in the ImageNet results.
1) Success Rate and Adversarial Probability Labels (Tar-
geted Attack Results): On Kaggle CIFAR-10, the success
rates of one-pixel attacks on three types of networks show
the generalized effectiveness of the proposed attack through
different network structures. On average, each image can be
perturbed to about two target classes for each network. In
addition, by increasing the number of pixels that can be
modified to three and five, the number of target classes that can
be reached increases significantly. By dividing the adversarial
probability labels by the success rates, the confidence values
(i.e. probability labels of target classes) are obtained which
are 79.39%, 79.17% and 77.09% respectively to one, three
and five-pixel attacks.
On ImageNet, the results show that the one pixel attack gen-
eralizes well to large size images and fool the corresponding
neural networks. In particular, there is 16.04% chance that an
arbitrary ImageNet test image can be perturbed to a target class
with 22.91% confidence. Note that the ImageNet results are
done with the same settings as CIFAR-10 while the resolution
of images we use for the ImageNet test is 227x227, which is
50 times larger than CIFAR-10 (32x32). Notice that in each
successful attack the probability label of the target class is the
AllConv NiN VGG16 BVLC
OriginAcc 86.94% 87.70% 85.45% 57.26%
Targeted 19.82% 23.15% 17.09% –
Non-targeted 68.71% 72.85% 63.53% 16.04%
Confidence 79.40% 75.02% 65.25% 22.91%
TABLE IV
RESULTS OF CONDUCTING ONE-PIXEL ATTACK ON FOUR DIFFERENT
TYPES OF NETWORKS: ALL CONVOLUTIONAL NETWORK (ALLCONV),
NETWORK IN NETWORK (NIN), VGG16 AND BVLC ALEXNET. THE
ORIGINALACC IS THE ACCURACY ON THE NATURAL TEST DATASETS.
TARGETED/NON-TARGETED INDICATE THE ACCURACY OF CONDUCTING
TARGETED/NON-TARGETED ATTACKS. CONFIDENCE IS THE AVERAGE
PROBABILITY OF TARGET CLASSES.
3 pixels 5 pixels
Success rate(tar) 40.57% 44.00%
Success rate(non-tar) 86.53% 86.34%
Rate/Labels 79.17% 77.09%
TABLE V
RESULTS OF CONDUCTING THREE-PIXEL ATTACK ON ALLCONV
NETWORKS AND FIVE-PIXEL ATTACK ON NETWORK IN NETWORK.
highest. Therefore, the confidence of 5.53% is relatively low
but tell us that the other remaining 999 classes are even lower
to an almost uniform soft label distribution. Thus, the one-
pixel attack can break the confidence of BVLC AlexNet to a
nearly uniform soft label distribution. The low confidence is
caused by the fact that we utilized a non-targeted evaluation
that only focuses on decreasing the probability of the true
class. Other fitness functions should give different results.
2) Number of Target Classes (Non-targeted Attack Results):
Regarding the results shown in Figure 5, we find that with only
one-pixel modification a fair amount of natural images can be
perturbed to two, three and four target classes. By increasing
the number of pixels modified, perturbation to more target
classes becomes highly probable. In the case of non-targeted
one-pixel attack, the VGG16 network got a slightly higher
robustness against the proposed attack. This suggests that all
three types of networks (AllConv network, NiN and VGG16)
are vulnerable to this type of attack.
The results of attacks are competitive with previous non-
targeted attack methods which need much more distortions
(Table 6). It shows that using one dimensional perturbation
vectors is enough to find the corresponding adversarial images
for most of the natural images. In fact, by increasing the
number of pixels up to five, a considerable number of images
can be simultaneously perturbed to eight target classes. In
some rare cases, an image can go to all other target classes
with one-pixel modification, which is illustrated in Figure 9.
3) Original-Target Class Pairs: Some specific original-
target class pairs are much more vulnerable than others (Fig-
ure 6 and 7). For example, images of cat (class 3) can be much
more easily perturbed to dog (class 5) but can hardly reach the
automobile (class 1). This indicates that the vulnerable target
classes (directions) are shared by different data points that
belong to the same class. Moreover, in the case of one-pixel
attack, some classes are more robust than others since their
data points can be relatively hard to perturb to other classes.
Among these data points, there are points that can not be
perturbed to any other classes. This indicates that the labels of
7Fig. 5. The graphs shows the percentage of natural images that were
successfully perturbed to a certain number (from 0 to 9) of target classes
by using one, three or five-pixel perturbation. The vertical axis shows the
percentage of images that can be perturbed while the horizontal axis indicates
the number of target classes.
these points rarely change when going across the input space
through n directions perpendicular to the axes. Therefore,
the corresponding original classes are kept robust along these
directions. However, it can be seen that such robustness can
rather easily be broken by merely increasing the dimensions of
perturbation from one to three and five because both success
rates and number of target classes that can be reached increase
when conducting higher-dimensional perturbations.
Additionally, it can also be seen that each heat-map matrix
is approximately symmetric, indicating that each class has
similar number of adversarial images which were crafted from
these classes as well as to these classes (Figure 8). Having said
that, there are some exceptions for example the class 8 (ship)
when attacking NiN, the class 4 (deer) when attacking AllConv
networks with one pixel, among others. In the ship class when
attacking NiN networks, for example, it is relatively easy to
craft adversarial images from them while it is relatively hard to
craft adversarial images to them. Such unbalance is intriguing
Fig. 6. Heat-maps of the number of times a successful attack is present with
the corresponding original-target class pair in one, three and five-pixel attack
cases. Red (vertical) and (horizontal) blue indices indicate respectively the
original and target classes. The number from 0 to 9 indicates respectively the
following classes: airplane, automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship,
truck.
since it indicates the ship class is similar to most of the other
classes like truck and airplane but not vice-versa. This might
be due to (a) boundary shape and (b) how close are natural
images to the boundary. In other words, if the boundary shape
is wide enough it is possible to have natural images far away
from the boundary such that it is hard to craft adversarial
images from it. On the contrary, if the boundary shape is
mostly long and thin with natural images close to the border,
it is easy to craft adversarial images from them but hard to
craft adversarial images to them.
In practice, such classes which are easy to craft adversarial
images from may be exploited by malicious users which
may make the whole system vulnerable. In the case here,
8Fig. 7. Heat-maps for one-pixel attack on Network in network and VGG.
AllConv NiN VGG16 BVLC
AvgEvaluation 16000 12400 20000 25600
AvgDistortion 123 133 145 158
TABLE VI
COST OF CONDUCTING ONE-PIXEL ATTACK ON FOUR DIFFERENT TYPES
OF NETWORKS. AVGEVALUATION IS THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF
EVALUATIONS TO PRODUCE ADVERSARIAL IMAGES. AVGDISTORTION IS
THE REQUIRED AVERAGE DISTORTION IN ONE-CHANNEL OF A SINGLE
PIXEL TO PRODUCE ADVERSARIAL IMAGES.
however, the exceptions are not shared between the networks,
revealing that whatever is causing the phenomenon is not
shared. Therefore, for the current systems under the given
attacks, such a vulnerability seems hard to be exploited.
4) Time complexity and average distortion: To evaluate the
time complexity we use the number of evaluations which is a
common metric in optimization. In the DE case the number
of evaluations is equal to the population size multiplied by the
number of generations. We also calculate the average distortion
on the single pixel attacked by taking the average modification
on the three color channels, which is a more straight forward
and explicit measure of modification strength. We did not use
the Lp norm due to its limited effectiveness of measuring
perceptiveness [38]. The results of two metrics are shown in
Table 7.
5) Comparing with Random One-Pixel Attack: We compare
the proposed method with the random attack to evaluate if DE
is truly helpful for conducting one-pixel non-targeted attack on
Kaggle CIFAR-10 dataset, which is shown in Table 8.
Specifically, for each natural image, the random search
Fig. 8. Number of successful attacks (vertical axis) for a specific class acting
as the original (black) and target (gray) class. The horizontal axis indicates
the index of each class which is the same as Figure 7.
repeats 100 times, each time randomly modifies one random
pixel of the image with random RGB value to attempt to
change its label. The confidence of the attack with respect
to one image is set to be the highest probability target class
label of 100 attacks.
In this experiment, we use the same number of evaluations
(80000) for both DE and random search. According to the
comparison, the DE is superior to the random attack regarding
attack accuracy, especially in the case of VGG16 network.
9Fig. 9. A natural image of the dog class that can be perturbed to all other nine
classes. The attack is conducted over the AllConv network using the proposed
one pixel attack. The table in the bottom shows the class labels output by the
target DNN, all with approximately 100% confidence. This curious result
further emphasize the difference and limitations of current methods when
compared to human recognition.
AllConv NiN VGG16
DE success rate 68.71% 72.85% 63.53%
Confidence 79.40% 75.02% 65.25%
Random Search success rate 49.70% 41.72% 15.57%
Confidence 87.73% 75.83% 59.90%
TABLE VII
A COMPARISON OF ATTACK RATE AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN DE
ONE-PIXEL ATTACK AND RANDOM ONE-PIXEL ATTACK (NON-TARGETED)
ON KAGGLE CIFAR-10 DATASET.
Specifically, DE is 19.01%, 31.13% and 47.96% more effi-
cient than random search respectively for All Convolutional
Network, Network in Network and VGG16. Even with a
less efficient result, random search is shown to find 49.70%
and 41.72% of the time for respectively All Convolutional
Network and Network in Network, therefore the vulnerable
pixels that can change the image label significantly are quite
common. That seems not to be the case for VGG though in
which random search achieves only 15.57%. DE has a similar
accuracy in all of them showing also a better robustness.
6) Change in fitness values: We run an experiment over
different networks to examine how the fitness changes during
evolution. The 30 (15) curves come from 30 (15) random Kag-
gle CIFAR-10 (ImageNet) images successfully attacked by the
proposed one-pixel attack (Figure 10). The fitness values are,
as previously described, set to be the probability label of the
true class for each image. The goal of the attack is to minimize
this fitness value. According to the results, it can be seen
that the fitness values can occasionally drop abruptly between
two generations while in other cases they decrease smoothly.
Moreover, the average fitness value decreases monotonically
with the number of generations, showing that the evolution
works as expected. We also find that BVLC network is harder
to fool due to the smaller decrease in fitness values.
Fig. 10. The change of fitness values during 100 generations of evolution
of images (non-targeted) attacked by the proposed method among different
network structures. The average values are highlighted by red dotted lines.
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AllConv NiN VGG16
Targeted 3.56% 4.93% 6.00%
Non-targeted1 22.67% 32.00% 30.33%
Confidence 54.10% 54.20% 49.34%
Non-targeted2 22.60% 35.20% 31.40%
Confidence 56.57% 60.08% 53.58%
TABLE VIII
RESULTS OF CONDUCTING ONE-PIXEL ATTACK ON ORIGINAL CIFAR-10
TEST SET. NON-TARGETED1 INDICATES THE NON-TARGETED ATTACK
ACCURACY CALCULATED FROM TARGETED ATTACK RESULTS AND
NON-TARGETED2 INDICATES THE TRUE NON-TARGETED ATTACK
ACCURACY. OTHER METRICS ARE THE SAME TO TABLE 4.
V. RESULTS ON ORIGINAL CIFAR-10 TEST DATA
We present another evaluation of one pixel attack which
is on original CIFAR-10 test dataset [12]. Comparing to the
results on Kaggle CIFAR-10 aforementioned, the scenario is
more limited since the images contain much less practical
noise. Therefore, the target CNNs can have higher classifica-
tion accuracy and confidence which definitely makes the attack
harder. Additionally, we only use images correctly classified
by the target CNNs while in the experiment on Kaggle CIFAR-
10 set we use all images (i.e., which contain wrongly classified
images) with their true labels predicted by the target CNNs.
We use 500 random images for non-targeted attack and
300 for targeted attack. Since the targeted attack is time-
consuming, we only set the number of population as 300
and number of maximum iteration as 50 for efficiency (i.e.,
we notice that one-pixel attack on kaggle CIFAR-10 always
succeeds in early iterations). We also make small modification
on network structure for better implementation. Specifically,
for the Network in Network, we remove the second average
pooling layers. For All convolutional network, we remove the
batch normalization on the first layer. All other settings are
kept the same. The attack results are shown by Table 8. The
number of target classes is shown by Figure 11. The number
of original-target class pairs is shown by the heat-maps of
Figure 12 and Figure 13. In addition to the number of original-
target class pairs, the total number of times each class had
an attack which either originated or targeted it is shown in
Figure 14 and Figure 15.
According to the attack results shown, we find the following
features of one-pixel attack on original CIFAR-10.
1. Attack rate: The three networks have higher robustness
to one-pixel attack according to the lower attack rate and con-
fidence (Table 8). This might due to the higher classification
accuracy and confidence of three networks on original CIFAR-
10 test-set. Similar to the results on Kaggle set, the network
in network still gets the lowest overall robustness considering
both attack rate and confidence. This might be related to the
proximity to the decision boundary. However, VGG network
becomes much more vulnerable in this case. The discrepancy
indicates that the robustness among different networks can be
varied when handling images with low (e.g. Kaggle CIFAR-
10) and high (e.g., original CIFAR-10) confidence.
2. Number of targeted classes: According to Figure 11, it
can be seen that in the case of targeted attack, it is still quite
common that a vulnerable image can be perturbed to more
than one class. In other words, the image might be locate near
Fig. 11. The percentage of natural images that were successfully perturbed to
a certain number (from 0 to 9) of target classes by one pixel targeted attack.
to the boundaries to multiple classes, especially in the case of
VGG. This is similar to the Kaggle CIFAR-10 results shown
by Fig 5.
Note that one image can be perturbed to a final target class
A through the original target class B (i.e. semi-successful
targeted attack). For some images, the number of B can be
more than one. We do not count it as a successful targeted
attack unless A = B.
3. Original-target class pairs: In both cases of targeted
and non-targeted attack we again found the existence of
vulnerable original-target classes pairs such as dog (5th)-cat
(3rd) (Figure 12 and Figure 13 ). In most cases, for a class pair
between class A and B, the number of successful perturbation
from A to B is similar to the number of B to A, which
makes the heat-maps almost symmetric. However, there are
exceptions such as ship (8th)-airplane (0th) pair, which the
perturbation from ship to airplane class is very frequent but
not vice versa.
Additionally, it also can be seen from Figure 14 and
Figure 15, some vulnerable classes exist which have higher
number of times being both original and target class of the
attack. A vulnerable original class is probably also vulnerable
being a target class to a similar extend.
Most of these features, together with the specific vulnerable
class-pairs shown by Figure 12 and Figure 13 and vulnerable
classes shown by Figure 14 and Figure 15, are similar or even
exactly the same to the finding on attacking Kaggle CIFAR-10
dataset.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Adversarial Perturbation
Previous results have shown that many data points might be
located near to the decision boundaries [9]. For the analysis
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Our method 35.20% 60.08% 1 (0.098%) NiN
Our method 31.40% 53.58% 1 (0.098%) VGG
LSA[15] 97.89% 72% 33 (3.24%) NiN
LSA[15] 97.98% 77% 30 (2.99%) VGG
FGSM[11] 93.67% 93% 1024 (100%) NiN
FGSM[11] 90.93% 90% 1024 (100%) VGG
TABLE IX
COMPASSION OF NON-TARGETED ATTACK EFFECTIVENESS BETWEEN THE
PROPOSED METHOD AND TWO PREVIOUS WORKS. THIS SUGGESTS THAT
ONE PIXEL IS ENOUGH TO CREATE ADVERSARIAL IMAGES FROM MOST OF
THE NATURAL IMAGES.
Fig. 12. Heat-maps of the number of times a successful attack is present with
the corresponding original-target class pair, for targeted attacks.
the data points were moved small steps in the input space
while quantitatively analyzing the frequency of change in the
class labels. In this paper, we showed that it is also possible
to move the data points along few dimension to find points
where the class labels change. Our results also suggest that the
Fig. 13. Heat-maps of the number of times a successful attack is present with
the corresponding original-target class pair, for non-targeted attacks.
assumption made by I. J. Goodfellow et al. that small addictive
perturbation on the values of many dimensions will accumulate
and cause huge change to the output [11], might not be
necessary for explaining why natural images are sensitive
to small perturbation. Since we only changed one pixel to
successfully perturb a considerable number of images.
According to the experimental results, the vulnerability of
CNN exploited by the proposed one pixel attack is generalized
through different network structures as well as different image
sizes. In addition, the results shown here mimics an attacker
and therefore uses a low number of DE iterations with a
relatively small set of initial candidate solutions. Therefore, the
perturbation success rates should improve further by having
either more iterations or a bigger set of initial candidate
solutions. Implementing more advanced algorithms such as
Co-variance Matrix Adaptation Evolution Strategy [32] instead
of DE might also achieve the same improvement. Additionally,
the proposed algorithm and the widely vulnerable images
(i.e. natural images that can be used to craft adversarial
images to most of the other classes) collected might be useful
for generating better artificial adversarial images in order to
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Fig. 14. Number of successful attacks (vertical axis) for a specific class acting
as the original (black) and target (gray) class, for targeted attacks.
augment the training dataset. This aids the development of
more robust models[19] which is left as future work.
B. Robustness of One-pixel Attack
Some recently proposed detection methods have shown high
accuracy of detecting adversarial perturbation. For example,
B.Liang et al. utilize noise reduction to effectively detect both
high and low-entropy images (e.g., bigger images give high
entropy values) [43]. In addition, W. Xu et al. show that
squeezing color bits and local/non-local spatial smoothing can
simultanously detect L0, L2 and L∞ attacks [42]. As the
trade-off of being a low-cost, easy-implemented L0 attack, we
do not expect one pixel attack can achieve signficantly better
robustness against such detection methods compared to other
L0 attacks such as [32].
However, such detection schemes add another layer of pre-
processing which increases the response time of the system.
For example, both [42] and [43] require image processing and
re-classification of the resulting images. Therefore they can
be inefficient when dealing with adversarial scenarios such as
novelty detection on security camera and image recognition
systems on autonomous driving applications which run in
real time with high frame rate. Besides, the impact of pre-
processing on the classification accuracy is still not fully
understood.
Detecting adversarial perturbation indeed can be helpful
in practice. However, the fundamental problem is still left
Fig. 15. Number of successful attacks (vertical axis) for a specific class acting
as the original (black) and target (gray) class, for non-targeted attacks.
unsolved: the neural networks are still not able to recognize
similar images as such, ignoring small adversarial perturba-
tion. By proposing novel attack methods, we aim to emphasize
the existence of different types of vulnerabilities and the
corresponding understanding.
VII. FUTURE WORK
The DE utilized in this research belongs to a big class of
algorithms called evolutionary strategies [48] which includes
other variants such as Adaptive DE [49] and Covariance matrix
adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-ES) [50], [51], [52]. In
fact, there are a couple of recent developments [61], [62], [63]
in evolutionary strategies and related areas that could further
improve the current method, allowing for more efficient and
accurate attacks.
Furthermore, evolutionary computation also provides some
promising approaches to solve adversarial machine learning
related vulnerabilities. In fact, evolutionary-based machine
learning allows for a great flexibility of models and may be an
answer to the same problems it is revealing. First, in an area
of evolutionary machine learning called neuroevolution, it was
shown to be possible to learn not just the weights but also the
topology of the network with evolutionary computation [26],
[44], [53]. In fact, SUNA [26] goes beyond current neural
models to propose a unified neuron model (e.g., time-scales,
neuromodulation, feedback, long-term memory) that can adapt
its structure and models to learn completely different problems
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(including non-markov problems) without changing any of
its hyper-parameters. This generality is currently surpassing
most if not all deep learning algorithms. Last but not least,
self-organizing and novelty-organizing classifiers can adapt to
changes in the environment by using flexible representations
[54], [55], [56]. For example, they can adapt to mazes that
change in shape and to problems where the scope of variables
change throughout the experiment [57]: a very challenging
scenario in which most if not all deep learning algorithms fail.
These among other achievements [58], [59] show a promising
path that may solve current problems in deep neural networks
in the years to come.
Besides, it can be seen that the one-pixel attack can be
potentially extended to other domains such as natural language
processing, speech recognition, which will be also left for
future work.
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